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No Such Thing as a Small Leak: Leakage-Abuse Attacks Against Symmetric Searchable Encryption

Abstract : Symmetric Searchable Encryption (SSE) schemes enable clients to securely outsource their data while maintaining the ability to perform keywords search over it. The security of these schemes is based on an explicit leakage pro le. [16], has initiated the investigation into how much information could be deduced in practice from this leakage. In this paper, after recalling the leakage hierarchy introduced in 2015 by Cash et al. and the passive attacks of [16] on SSE schemes. We demonstrate the effectiveness of these attacks on a wider set of real-world datasets than previously shown. On the other hand, we show that the attacks are inefficient against some types of datasets. Finally, we used what we learned from the unsuccessful datasets to give insight into future countermeasures.
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Contributor : Pascal Lafourcade <>
Submitted on : Saturday, April 3, 2021 - 2:39:19 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, May 5, 2021 - 10:05:13 AM


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  • HAL Id : hal-01990354, version 1



Alexandre Anzala-Yamajako, Olivier Bernard, Matthieu Giraud, Pascal Lafourcade. No Such Thing as a Small Leak: Leakage-Abuse Attacks Against Symmetric Searchable Encryption. Communications in Computer and Information Science, Springer Verlag, 2019, E-Business and Telecommunications 14th International Joint Conference, ICETE 2017, Madrid, Spain, July 24-26, 2017, Revised Selected Paper, 990, pp.253-277. ⟨hal-01990354⟩



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