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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2018

Auction mechanisms for Licensed Shared Access: reserve prices and revenue-fairness trade offs

Résumé

Licensed shared access (LSA) is a new approach that allows Mobile Network Operators to use a portion of the spectrum initially licensed to another incumbent user, by obtaining a license from the regulator via an auction mechanism. In this context, diierent truthful auction mechanisms have been proposed, and diier in terms of allocation (who gets the spectrum) but also on revenue. Since those mechanisms could generate an extremely low revenue, we extend them by introducing a reserve price per bidder which represents the minimum amount that each winning bidder should pay. Since this may be at the expense of the allocation fairness, for each mechanism we nd by simulation the reserve price that optimizes a trade-oo between expected fairness and expected revenue. Also, for each mechanism, we analytically express the expected revenue when valuations of operators for the spectrum are independent and identically distributed from a uniform distribution.
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Dates et versions

hal-01883697 , version 1 (28-09-2018)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-01883697 , version 1

Citer

Ayman Chouayakh, Aurelien Bechler, Isabel Amigo, Loutfi Nuaymi, Patrick Maillé. Auction mechanisms for Licensed Shared Access: reserve prices and revenue-fairness trade offs. IFIP WG PERFORMANCE 2018 - 36th International Symposium on Computer Performance, Modeling, Measurements and Evaluation 2018, Dec 2018, Toulouse, France. ⟨hal-01883697⟩

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