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First-price auctions with reimbursement in NSP alliances with asymmetric buyers

Abstract : We propose a pricing scheme for Quality-assured services over Network Service Providers (NSPs) alliances which is based on First-price auctions and where a pre-announced percentage of the price paid is reimbursed if the quality is not satisfied. The use of First-price auctions and an optimal percentage of reimbursement, q, maximizes the seller's revenue and provides an easy-to-apply scheme. We consider asymmetric buyers, i.e. their willingness to pay are not alike, which while more realistic than typical symmetric scenarios, limits the possibilities to determine q analytically. We propose a simulator that approximates q. Simulations show that the optimal percentage of reimbursement is q = 100% and that this value prevents problems such as the market for lemons, which we show would arise if no reimbursement is in place.
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https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01167135
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Submitted on : Tuesday, June 23, 2015 - 6:49:05 PM
Last modification on : Friday, October 22, 2021 - 9:48:02 AM

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Isabel Amigo, Sandrine Vaton, Pablo Belzarena. First-price auctions with reimbursement in NSP alliances with asymmetric buyers. LANC 2014 : 8th Latin America Networking Conference, Sep 2014, Montevideo, Uruguay. pp.Art. n°1 -, ⟨10.1145/2684083.2684084⟩. ⟨hal-01167135⟩

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